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6.1 Introduction: Industrial Relations in Spain
In Spain works councils are legally defined as unitary bodies for the repre-
sentation of workers at the workplace. The law also regulates the existence of
union sections inside the firm. In this sense, there is a dual system of worker
representation in Spanish labor relations. However, in contrast to many other
systems, the "second channel" of interest representation is especially salient in
relation to the unions, which control the works councils and implement their
policies at the firm level through them. One of the main questions that the
Spanish case raises is precisely whether and to what extent it is possible for a
union to pursue its policies effectively by means of an institution with union
and nonunion duties. Another important question concerns the implications of
a council representation system in a country with two main unions divided
along ideological and political lines: the socialist Union General de Trabaja-
dores (UGT—General Union of Workers) and the communist Comisiones
Obreras (CCOO—Workers' Commissions).
Historically there has been a succession of very different labor relations sys-
tems in Spain. Since the 1930s, the country has experienced four different
combinations of unionism and works councils: free unionism without works
councils during the Second Republic (1931-39), neither free unions nor works
councils under fascism (1939-53), works councils without free unionism
(1953-77), and both free unions and works councils (1977 to the present).
Modesto Escobar is professor of sociology at Universidad de Salamanca and a research associ-
ate at the Center for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences of the Instituto Juan March de Estudios
e Investigaciones.
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Works councils were first discussed in 1921 when the Institute for Social
Reforms, a government advisory body, inspired by the creation of works coun-
cils in Germany in 1920, proposed the introduction of industrial cooperation
councils, through the Law on Employment Contracts that was being debated
at the time. However, unions and employers, both represented in the institute,
took very different positions, and the project did not succeed (Borrajo 1975;
Cabrera 1987; Soto 1989). However, it returned during the Second Republic
in 1931, when a parliamentary commission approved the creation of unionized
"intervention councils of workers" in all nonagricultural firms with a work-
force of more than 50. Again, employers opposed the project, and it failed to
get the approval of the Republican parliament (Borrajo 1975; Cabrera 1983).
During the Spanish Civil War many firms were expropriated. Revolutionary
works councils led by the anarchist National Confederation of Labor (CNT)
and, in some cases, by the socialist UGT confiscated enterprises and imposed
a collectivistic production regime in agriculture and industry, especially in Re-
publican regions such as Catalonia, Aragon, and Valencia (Girona 1987;
Bosch, 1987; Casanova 1988).
The industrial relations system changed dramatically in the first phase of
Francoism (1939-58), when it came to be based on "corporations." Unions
were outlawed, with the exception of an official syndicate which both employ-
ers and workers were forced to join. Through this "vertical union," the state
controlled labor relations on the assumption that there was no basic conflict
between the interests of employers and those of workers. Wages and working
conditions were regulated by governmental decree, and the hierarchical organi-
zation of the firm was established under a set of statutes called ordenanzas
laborales. However, the official union was unable to control the regulation of
production in every firm, as its activists were not numerous enough to be pres-
ent in every workplace. For this reason, restricted works council elections were
introduced, to legitimize the vertical union and to ensure the effective imple-
mentation of the ordenanzas laborales. This explains why the law on jurados
de empresa, the first form of legally based works councils in Spain, was passed
as early as 1947, long before the economic liberalization program of the late
1950s.
The second period of the Franco regime (1958-75) was characterized by
economic liberalization. The autarchic economic strategy was replaced with
an opening toward international markets. Labor repression was loosened
through the introduction of a controlled system of collective bargaining in
1958 that gave negotiating rights to the already existing works councils and
paved the way for the emergence of semiclandestine unions (Maravall 1978;
Foweraker 1989; Balfour 1989). The state tried to control the system by reserv-
ing for itself the right to veto the candidates in works council elections, approve
agreements between employers and workers, and impose compulsory arbitra-
tion if the two sides did not come to an agreement (Amsden 1972).
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were aimed at granting bargaining autonomy to employers and workers and
making the Spanish industrial relations system similar to that of other Western
European countries. Free unions and employers' associations were admitted,
and most of the mechanisms of state intervention in this area were dismantled.
Works councils had their name changed from jurados de empresa to comites
de empresa. Their compulsory presence was extended from enterprises with
more than 50 to those with more than 10 employees, although in the smallest
firms they were called delegados de personal (staff delegates). Also, state con-
trol over the electoral system was abolished, and workers and unions were
given the right to present freely selected lists of candidates. Furthermore,
unions were given certain competitive advantages in council elections over
nonunion lists, and councils became worker-only bodies, no longer including
the employer as they had under Franco. Finally, their cooperative functions
were deemphasized in favor of representative functions, without detracting
from the employer's right to manage.
There was a general conviction that works councils were institutions that
should be allowed to survive in the context of a democratic industrial relations
system. More problematic was their function in relation to unions. At the be-
ginning of the transition, union workplace organizations were not legally rec-
ognized, putting many functions in the hands of the works councils, including
firm-level negotiation and the organization of strikes. The bargaining role of
unions inside the firms was not recognized until the Ley Estatuto de los Traba-
jadores (LET—Workers' Statute) of 1980.
At the same time, the new democratic labor legislation eliminated the repre-
sentation of workers on the boards of enterprises, which had existed since 1962
and had provided for one worker for every six employer representatives. This
is explained by union rejection of participation in a minority position in the
management of private firms, as well as by employer resistance to parity on
company boards. Unions were, however, eager to participate in the manage-
ment of public enterprises. Participation was implemented in two stages: first,
via union representation in public regulatory institutions and, second, with the
introduction of union representation on the boards of public enterprises by an
agreement in 1986 between UGT and the National Institute of Industry (INI),
which is the holding company for Spanish public enterprises.
Simultaneously, a new union system emerged in the course of the democrati-
zation of Spanish institutions. To understand Spanish works councils better, it
is necessary to sketch the main features of this system. First, the Spanish model
of unionism may be labeled one of representative duopoly. In response to the
multitude of union names that were registered immediately following the
opening of the Register of Union Organizations in 1977, legal mechanisms
were devised to insure the predominance of majority unions, similar to the
French and Italian concept of "most representative" worker organizations. In
contrast with these cases, however, works council elections, which are held
nationwide every four years within a period of three months, are used to estab-156 Modesto Escobar
lish the representativeness of the unions. This has resulted in small unions los-
ing representative status unless they are strictly concentrated in one sector or
geographical area.
Representative duopoly in Spanish unionism has a number of exceptions,
the most important ones being regionally based unions. In the Basque country,
the Christian Democratic Solidarity of Basque Workers (ELA-STV) fills the
largest number of council seats. The same holds in Galicia for the Nationalist
Union of Galician Workers (INTG), now known as the Galician Inter-Union
Coalition (CIG). As a consequence, both have achieved the status of represen-
tative unions in their regions as well as for national-level collective bargaining.
In addition, in individual enterprises there often are minority unions with more
than 10 percent of elected councillors, giving them the right to negotiate col-
lective agreements. Among these are the socialist autonomous Union Sindical
Obrera (USO), the anarchist General Confederation of Workers (CGT), which
exists mainly in Catalonia, the Independent Union Confederation of Civil Ser-
vants (CSIF) in public administration, and various company unions or non-
union lists that arise where the majority unions are weak, or where there are
charismatic leaders that are not integrated in those organizations.
A second feature of Spanish unionism is its political dependence. As in all
southern European countries, the major unions are linked with political parties
and are typically subordinate to them. The relationship of the UGT with the
Partido Socialista Obrero Espafiol (PSOE—Spanish Socialist Workers'party)
is rooted in the origins of the two organizations. The UGT was set up by PSOE
activists. During the tenure of its first general secretary, Pablo Iglesias, the top
leadership was the same for both organizations. After Iglesias's retirement in
1918, the leadership was divided between Francisco Largo Caballero and Ju-
lian Besteiro, although each of them was on both the PSOE and UGT executive
committees.
1 In the Second Republic the two leaders disagreed fundamentally
on economic and political matters, leading to deep division among the party
and union rank and file during the Civil War (Gillespie 1988, 35-52).
Both Largo Caballero and Besteiro lived in exile until the beginning of the
1970s, a time when younger leaders emerged in Spain. Most prominent among
them were Nicolas Redondo, from the Basque socialist movement, and Felipe
Gonzalez. The 1973 UGT congress in Toulouse, France, marked the ascent of
Redondo to the top leadership of the union. After Redondo relinquished his
role in the party at the 1974 congress in Suresnes, Felipe Gonzalez, leader of
a Sevillian group of socialists, was named the new secretary general of the
PSOE, with an executive committee composed of domestic leaders.
Until 1985, Redondo and Gonzalez worked together without major frictions.
Their common goal was the growth of their respective organizations, which
1. At the end of the 1920s, "of the eleven positions in each of the two executive committees,
eight were held by officials who were in both committees, and the five who were in control of
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they could achieve only through mutual assistance. The PSOE, the main oppo-
sition party from 1977 to 1982, formed a common front with the UGT against
the government of the Union de Centro Democratico (UCD), a coalition of
many small parties. In the first years of the Socialist government, the UGT took
advantage of its good relations with the government to improve its position in
competition with CCOO. However, the PSOE's program of economic stabiliza-
tion was bound to conflict with the desire of the UGT to protect working-
class interests. The new law on retirement benefits, the project for industrial
restructuring, the liberalization of labor markets, the priority given to the fight
against inflation, low wage increases, and high unemployment caused a pro-
gressive deterioration in the relationship between the party in government and
the unions. The schism began with Redondo's vote in Parliament against the
new pension law and continued with the resignation of the UGT leadership
from the Socialist parliamentary group; it climaxed in a general strike in De-
cember 1988 that paralyzed the country in protest against the government's
economic policy.
The CCOO, on its part, which had emerged spontaneously from worker ac-
tivism under Francoism, was used by the Partido Comunista de Espana
(PCE—Communist party) in its fight against the dictatorship from within its
institutions. Although originally the union was a politically independent organ-
ization committed to the struggle for working-class interests and accepted in
its core not only independent members but also activists from other parties
(Ariza 1976), at the beginning of the 1970s all major executive positions were
held by PCE members. After the transition, however, the CCOO also gained
more independence, although for very different reasons than the UGT—not
because of differences in political strategy, but because of the PCE's political
weakness. As long as the party was strong, it used the union as a platform for
its political objectives. However, when the PCE lost almost its entire parlia-
mentary representation in the 1982 elections, the union recovered the politi-
cal initiative.
Third, Spanish unions are organizationally weak, having together with
France the lowest membership figures in Western Europe. Today, approxi-
mately 10 to 15 percent of the employed wage-earning population is affiliated
to a union (Escobar 1991). Membership density reached its peak in 1978 with
approximately 40 percent and declined to a little more than 20 percent in 1981.
In the manufacturing industry, too, surveys have periodically shown a declining
tendency since the end of the 1970s. In 1978, 42 percent of industrial workers
were not affiliated to a union. In 1980, this proportion increased to 60.7 per-
cent, and in 1984, it reached 75.4 percent (Perez-Diaz 1985, 1992).
This dramatic decline has several explanations. The euphoria of the transi-
tion was associated with rapid but unstable growth in the desire to participate
in public life, principally through neighborhood associations and workers' as-
sociations. There also was an initial belief that union members would have
advantages over nonmembers—this was disappointed by the unions' inability158 Modesto Escobar
to gain favorable agreements for their members at a time of economic crisis.
Spanish unions also failed to offer attractive services to their members. In addi-
tion, the economic crisis with high unemployment did not favor stable mem-
bership, nor did the evolution of the economic structure, especially the growth
of the service sector, of the black market, and of new forms of business organi-
zation. The membership decline reached its bottom before the general strike
of 1988. The strike seems to have resulted in a progressive absolute increase
in membership, tracing the simultaneous growth in employment. According to
the UGT, between 1986 and 1989 its membership grew from 333,000 to nearly
half a million, a 44 percent increase (UGT 1989, 53). In the CCOO there was
a 33 percent increase between 1984 and 1989, from 375,000 also to about half
a million.
Membership figures do not adequately reflect the power and influence of
Spanish unions, however. Support for unionism, as reflected in voting behavior
in council elections, must also be taken into account. At the beginning of the
transition, three-fourths of industrial workers were in favor of unionism. In a
1980 survey 47.8 percent showed no support for any union organization, and
in 1984 the same segment had declined to 41.2 percent, despite the continuing
decline in membership (Perez-Diaz 1992). In 1988, 43.5 percent did not sym-
pathize with any union (Instituto de Estudios Sociologicos [IDES] 1989), and
in 1991, with a differently worded question, 62.4 percent of the workers re-
sponded in this way (Escobar 1991). The data seem to indicate growing disen-
chantment with unionism during the mid-1980s and early 1990s.
The weakness of Spanish unions is especially visible in their organizations.
The low number of full-time staff working for the UGT—less than 100 people
in 1989—the low number of elected officials, and the poor training of its activ-
ists impinge on the union's effectiveness. Unlike their Western European coun-
terparts, Spanish unions are very young. After 40 years of illegality, they had
to build their organizations in a short period of time. Fifteen years, mostly of
economic crisis, are not enough to create the organizational infrastructure of
effective union activity. Organizational weakness is particularly evident in the
shortage of financial resources. Spanish unions keep their dues low to avoid
further loss of members. This forces them to cut costs, though at the same time
they must offer services to their members. As a consequence, unions have to
turn to other sources of revenue. In particular, the state became the big benefac-
tor of the unions in the mid-1980s, mainly as a result of the law requiring
restitution of union property confiscated by the Francoist regime—a law that
was especially advantageous to the UGT.
It is also true, however, that Spanish unions have considerable mobilizing
capacity. In part this is the result of the experiences of the working class under
Francoism. During Franco's last 20 years, worker organizations were illegal; it
was, therefore, impossible to build a formal network of union activities. How-
ever, by allowing collective negotiation, the regime gave union leaders the op-159 Spain: Works Councils or Unions?
portunity to learn to mobilize workers in adverse conditions of police control
and semi-illegality of strikes.
This has produced three major forms of union mobilization: sectoral or en-
terprise strikes, general strikes, and demonstrations. Strikes at the sectoral or
enterprise level are the main way of promoting union demands. They take place
either during the negotiation of collective agreements or when employers do
not adhere to an agreement. The majority of work days lost results from this
type of conflict. During the 1980s, industrial conflict was more frequent in
Spain than anywhere else in Europe—it was slightly higher than in Italy. Con-
flict was most intense in the four years from 1976 to 1979 (table 6.1), during
the transition period, when workers mobilized for demands pent up from the
time of the dictatorship and the unions acted to establish their presence and
prove their power.
The main indicator of the unions' mobilizing capacity is the effectiveness
of their strike calls, which can be measured by the percentage of workplaces
or workers that join a strike. Since 1986, the first year for which reliable data
are available, the effectiveness of strike mobilization with respect to work-
places has normally been above 70 percent, and with respect to workers it
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de Hacienda, Secretaria General Tecnica, various years); Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, En-
cuesta sobre Poblacion Activa (Madrid, various years).
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exceeded 75 percent every year. In 1986 it even reached 94 percent of a total
of one and three-quarter million workers called out to strike.
General strikes may be called for subnational geographical areas. During
industrial restructuring, several general strikes took place in localities such as
Sagunto and Reinosa, whose main industrial plants were closed, and in regions
like Asturias and Murcia. Since the beginning of the transition, only five gen-
eral strikes have been called for the entire country. The first was called by the
CCOO against a wage freeze and for amnesty, freedom, and democracy. At the
time the UGT had not yet held its first congress and did not participate in the
call to strike. The second general strike was called by the short-lived, Coordi-
nating Committee of Union Organizations (COS), which included the UGT,
CCOO, and USO, against the referendum for political reform and in support
of a joint platform of Socialist, Communist, and other centrist or leftist parties.
The third followed the attempted coup d'etat of 1981 led by Colonel Tejero
and was called only by the CCOO, as was the strike in 1985 against the Retire-
ment Pension Law. Next was the general strike of 1988, called by the two
majority unions against the Socialist government's economic policies, which
was a complete success for its organizers. Finally, in 1992 the CCOO and UGT
called for a four-hour general strike, with less success, against a governmental
decree cutting unemployment benefits and proposed legislation regulating
strikes.
6.2 Spanish Works Councils since Democratization: The Political and
Economic Setting
Works councils played an important role during the transition to democracy
(1975-78). For the 1975 elections of jurados de empresa, the CCOO promoted
in many firms so-called candidaturas unitarias y democrdticas (CUD—demo-
cratic unitary lists), with candidates belonging to different illegal parties or
unions which had been in opposition to the Franco regime. The anarchists and
the Socialists of the newly founded UGT, for their part, opposed participation
in these elections.
The CUD were successful in some sectors of the economy and in certain
geographical areas. Balfour (1989) has reported documents, found in the head-
quarters of the police in Barcelona, that include a chart of the election results
in that province. Sixty-nine percent of the elected delegates belonged to the
CUD. Among them, police classified 44 percent as red (sic)—and of these,
9 percent as good (sic) and 22 percent as bad, many of the latter being mem-
bers or sympathizers of clandestine organizations with a "criminal" record or
at least a personal file in the police archives. In some places an alternative to
representation by jurados de empresa was organized by the workers. This sys-
tem consisted mostly in nonstanding committees elected in mass meetings; it
disappeared after the first democratic works council elections in 1978.
The initial period of the transition was marked by high political mobilization161 Spain: Works Councils or Unions?
and strong demands for higher wages. Works councils whose members be-
longed to an opposition party or union played an important role in mobilizing
workers in favor of one of the two paths to democracy that were discussed at
the time. Two main political options were available (Maravall and Santamaria
1986): reforma (reform) and ruptura (breakup). The former entailed a smooth
process of democratization that preserved some elements of the old regime;
the latter favored more rapid change through the formation of a provisional
government. Most local labor leaders endorsed the second choice and mobi-
lized for it (Fishman 1990). The confrontation between the two models re-
sulted in the adoption of a compromise path to democracy, called "negotiated
reform" and backed by the two main leftist parties, the PSOE and PCE. Works
councils and workers, backed by the semi-illegal unions, also managed to ob-
tain high wage increases during this period, in a time of international eco-
nomic crisis.
Nineteen seventy-seven was a key year in the transformation of labor rela-
tions in Spain. Unions were legalized under a pluralist model, against the pol-
icy of the CCOO, which tried to build a unitary union structure. Two govern-
mental decrees were issued clarifying the rules of industrial relations, one
regulating collective bargaining and the right to strike and the other establish-
ing worker representation through comites de empresa and the rules for the
first democratic works councils. In addition, the first attempt to deal with the
economic crisis through social pacts was made, although the first pact included
only the main parties with parliamentary representation, ranging from the
moderate right to the Communists (Pactos de la Moncloa).
The second period (1978-85) in the evolution of industrial relations in the
young Spanish democracy was one of social as opposed to political concerta-
tion. After the Moncloa Pacts, the first two accords were reached between the
peak employers' organization, the Confederation Espanola de Organizaciones
Empresariales (CEOE), and the Socialist UGT. While the CCOO tried to rely
on direct mobilization of the workers, the UGT engaged in negotiation with
employers, offering moderation in exchange for union recognition at the work-
place. At the national level, wage increases were agreed, together with the con-
tents of the coming legislation on industrial relations, the Workers' Statute.
One result were new confrontations at the enterprise and provincial levels be-
tween the two main unions, with the UGT willing to negotiate wage raises
within the limits set at the national level and the CCOO trying to mobilize
workers to obtain more, at least in firms not suffering from the effects of the
crisis. This led to a debate about the structure of collective bargaining in which
the CCOO defended an articulated form of negotiation, under which
agreements at lower levels could improve on the national agreement, while the
UGT and CEOE favored the extension of the national agreement to all lower
levels of bargaining, except in situations of economic crisis.
Bilateral social concertation between the UGT and CEOE broke up for two
reasons: the danger of a breakdown of democracy, as evidenced by the unsuc-162 Modesto Escobar
cessful coup d'etat of 1981, and the worsening of economic conditions, mani-
fested mainly in high unemployment. These two factors made the CCOO join
social concertation, leading to the National Agreement on Employment that
was signed in 1981 by the government, the CEOE, and the Socialist and Com-
munist unions. Two years later another agreement followed, negotiated by the
CEOE, UGT, and CCOO, without the signature but with the approval of
the Socialist government. The two agreements reduced the conflict between
the unions but generated tensions inside the CCOO that led to a decline in its
membership and its representation on works councils, in favor of the UGT. At
the time, social concertation seemed to be effective in controlling inflation and
labor conflicts; it was, however, unable to improve employment (table 6.1).
In 1985, the UGT, but not the CCOO, signed together with the employers
and the Socialist government a national agreement that ended the period of
centralized collective bargaining and income policies (Espina 1990). All pacts
had focused on industrial relations outside the firm, giving a salient role to the
peak union organizations at the expense of works councils and other local
union structures (Giner and Sevilla 1984; Roca 1987; Zaragoza 1988; Perez-
Diaz 1992). At the workplaces, a deep division developed between the two
unions' sections, with the CCOO accusing the UGT of following and imple-
menting government policy, and the UGT accusing the CCOO of supporting
Communist party opposition to the Socialist government. After the CCOO had
won the majority in the two first works council elections, the UGT, backed by
the Socialist party, won the majority of seats in 1982.
During the period of social concertation, the Socialist government promoted
a tough plan to restructure several sectors affected by the crisis. While the
UGT took a moderate position on this, the CCOO adopted a strategy of count-
ermobilization. Works councils, under pressure from the rank and file, tried to
defend the current level of employment and negotiate the best possible condi-
tions for layoffs. The Socialist government also tried to make labor markets
more flexible, amending the chapter on employment of the Workers' Statute to
open the way for new forms of employment contracts. While this was to in-
crease employment and facilitate the creation of new jobs, it resulted in the
segmentation of the workforce and the creation within workplaces of two kinds
of workers with different interests, raising new problems for the works
councils.
In its dealings with unions, in its first period the Socialist government
backed the UGT. Legislation was passed that gave union sections a seat on
works councils and the right to be recognized by employers. In addition, mea-
sures were taken to support unions financially in a way that favored the UGT.
After Spain's accession to the European Community in 1986 and as a result of
a restrictive monetary policy that raised interest rates, foreign capital increas-
ingly flowed into Spain, mainly benefiting the financial sector but also re-
sulting in key companies being sold at low prices.
A new period began after 1985, when the expectations of UGT leaders that163 Spain: Works Councils or Unions?
the government they supported would pursue social democratic policies were
finally disappointed. This gave rise to tensions and estrangement between them
and the Socialist party. The first strains were related to the government's policy
of industrial restructuring, but the issues that led to the greatest tensions were
a pension reform designed to reduce public expenditure, various measures to
increase labor market flexibility—like the Decreto sobre Empleo Juvenil (De-
cree on Youth Employment) that was the immediate cause of the successful
general strike—and more recently the reduction of unemployment benefits.
After the mid-1980s, macroeconomic concertation no longer took place.
The UGT argued that it was time that workers benefited from economic growth
and business profits, which were to a large extent due to wage moderation
during the democratic transition. The government, for its part, absolutely re-
fused to make concessions, arguing that a wage increase was incompatible
with the objectives of low inflation and competitiveness in the European Com-
mon Market. The employers' association, the CEOE, closed ranks with the
government, while the CCOO, given the Communist party's political weak-
ness, tried to forge an alliance with the UGT in an attempt to weaken the So-
cialist party's base among workers. As a consequence, wage negotiations had
to take place at the regional, provincial, or firm level, where the UGT and
CCOO tried to obtain increases above the wage raise proposed by the govern-
ment. In the public sector, no agreement was possible and conflicts increased;
in the private sector, employers, in a context of economic recovery, were will-
ing to concede wage increases as long as they could assure social peace, and
perhaps in order to divide the unions and the government.
The effects on works councils of this new economic and political scenario
were dramatic. The UGT and CCOO became more likely to take similar posi-
tions in negotiating with employers, especially with public firms, while at the
same time enjoying greater autonomy from central unions and no longer being
restricted by peak-level negotiations. In 1991 and 1992, national unions re-
frained from issuing general wage guidelines for their members on negotiating
committees, and unionized workforce representatives began to negotiate high
raises in exchange for collaboration with employers trying to adapt their enter-
prises to more open markets, subsequent to the integration of Spain into the
European Community.
6.3 Legal Regulations
The structure, composition, election, duties, and rights of Spanish works
councils are highly regulated, mainly through the Workers' Statute approved
by Parliament in 1980, at the end of the transition period. The statute permits
further regulation by formal or informal collective agreements and is comple-
mented by a large number of court rulings resolving conflicts of interpretation
between employers and employees (Rodriguez-Safiudo 1988; Martin Herrero164 Modesto Escobar
1991; Albiol 1992). The rights conferred by the Workers' Statute to the works
councils are the following:
Information rights: The employer must inform the works council at least
quarterly of the economic development of the sector and the firm's production,
sales, and employment prospects. The council must also be informed annually
of the balance. In joint-stock companies, the employer must provide the coun-
cil with all the documents he distributes to shareholders. Works councils must
also be regularly informed on other topics, such as the level of absenteeism,
work accidents, and occupational diseases. A posteriori, the works council
must be given information on all sanctions imposed on workers for offenses.
Finally, councils are empowered to review all written contract forms, and since
1990 employers must give councils an abstract of every new employment con-
tract, with the exception of those for senior management.
Consultation rights: Although the Workers' Statute reserves the manage-
ment function for the employer, works councils have the right to be heard on
matters such as reduction of working time, redundancies, job reorganization,
functional and geographic mobility of workers, training programs, introduc-
tion or revision of systems of work organization or supervision, and changes
in the incentive system and job evaluation. These are important resources for
works councils in influencing management decisions. The Workers' Statute
specifies that in cases of redundancies and major changes in work organiza-
tion, management must obtain authorization from the public authorities unless
an agreement is reached with the works council.
Legal action rights: One of the most important functions works councils
perform in Spain in monitoring the implementation of labor legislation and
collective agreements. For this purpose, they have the right to take judicial or
administrative action against employers and can take them to court for not
observing legal regulations regarding not only the works council itself, but also
the entire workforce.
Negotiation rights: From the legal reintroduction of collective bargaining in
1958, at a time when unions were banned, works councils have been entitled
to negotiate collective agreements at the enterprise level. They have retained
this right, while unions must meet certain criteria to be entitled to bargain.
2
The scope of the bargaining rights of Spanish works councils includes wages,
working time, union rights, and any other labor questions.
Right to strike: While works councils in other European countries typically
have no legal recourse to the strike, Spanish councils do. The right to strike is
usually exercised while negotiations are taking place, during conflicts over the
interpretation of collective agreements, or to bring pressure to bear on other
employer decisions not regulated by law or industrial agreement.
2. They need recognition from the employer. Alternatively, they must, either alone or together
with other organizations, have more than 50 percent of the representatives elected in the sector or
region for which negotiations are held.165 Spain: Works Councils or Unions?
Right to manage the social funds of the firm: Almost every big firm in Spain
has a special fund to promote the social welfare of the workers. The money is
used to make low-interest loans, to subsidize the education of the children of
workers, and to organize sports competitions, parties, and clubs. According to
the law, these funds must be co-managed by the works council together with
the employer.
Complementing their rights, Spanish works councils have the following ob-
ligations: to collaborate with management in maintaining and increasing pro-
ductivity, to inform the workers on all matters related to the firm's labor rela-
tions, and to observe confidentiality on all information their members receive
in their capacity as workforce representatives. The law requires the employer
to provide works councils with resources, in particular adequate office space
and notice boards and paid time off for performance of representative func-
tions, depending on the number of employees in the workplace. Council mem-
bers also enjoy special protection from dismissals.
Spanish works councils are elected by a firm's entire workforce. However,
in firms with more than 250 employees, they also include directly appointed
union delegates that have the same rights and obligations as the other members,
except that they are not allowed to vote. The number of council members de-
pends on the size of the plant. The Workers' Statute makes the workplace the
basis for the election, but the definition of "workplace" is left unclear. Different
locations and sizes of a firm's plants gives rise to conflict between workers and
employers in delimiting works council constituencies. Workers and unions try
to increase the number of elections in order to have adequate organizational
structures in each single workplace, while employers prefer to hold common
elections for all plants in order to minimize the costs of council representation.
Table 6.2 shows the legal number of council members by size of workplace.












































"Starts at 25, plus one for every 1,000 additional workers, up to a maximum of 75.
Three for workplaces with fewer than 5,000 workers, and four for larger workplaces.166 Modesto Escobar
A firm with three plants in the same province, each with 200 employees, could
either agree to set up three works councils with 9 members each, or have only
one works council with 17 members, which means that it would have to pay
for 10 fewer representatives. A good example of the possible consequences of
reorganization of constituencies is the Spanish National Railways, which be-
fore the 1986 elections reduced the number of constituencies from 134 to 51—
one works council for each province, except for Madrid with four and Barce-
lona with two—and the number of representatives from 1,947 to 1,139 (Ferner
1988, 94).
Although the entire workforce of a plant or firm has the right to vote, the
law divides the elections in workplaces with more than 49 employees into two
"colleges," one for technical and administrative staff (or white-collar workers)
and the other for skilled and unskilled (blue-collar) workers. The Workers'
Statute makes it possible to establish a third college for middle management
by collective agreement. This, however, has only rarely been done: in the 1990
elections, only 8,143 voters were classified in the third college (excluding the
Basque country; UGT 1992). The objective of the division is to assure the
proportional representation of each group of workers where one of them con-
stitutes a minority. Unions or workers can call elections every four years.
Works councils are not compulsory unless there is an initiative to form one,
either from a representative union or from the majority of the workers in a
plant or firm. Most works council elections take place within a period of three
months, so that the results can be used for granting unions representative status
at the territorial or functional level above the individual firm. Where several
unions or groups of employees schedule an election, the first initiative has pri-
ority over later ones. In the 1990 elections, the CCOO, being a representative
union at the national level and thus having the right to call elections every-
where, scheduled elections in more than 200,000 workplaces. Its strategy was
to hold elections as early as possible in the three-month period in those firms
in which it expected to win a majority and delay elections to the end of the
period in firms that it might win. In this way, the campaigns of the rival unions
would not jeopardize its victory in "CCOO firms," while a good CCOO cam-
paign might influence the results in the others. However, all this strategy led to
a harsh confrontation between the two main unions and mutual charges of elec-
toral fraud during the three-month election period.
3
6.4 Presence and Composition of Works Councils
From the first democratic elections in 1978, the number of workplaces
where works council elections are held within the three-month period has in-
creased, especially after 1986 (table 6.3). This can be attributed to growing
3. Even after the elections, there were mutual accusations of fraud. This is the reason the govern-












































Source: Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social (MTSS 1992).
aPublic administration only.
bExcluding public administration.
competition between the two main unions, as well as to new legislation in
1985 that gave unions more rights in the workplace and confirmed that the
"representativeness" of a union depended on the election results. According to
the law, a union is representative at any level if it obtains more than 10 percent
of council seats at the national level, or more than 15 percent at the regional
level. Furthermore, since the 1977 Moncloa Pacts, unions and employers' asso-
ciations have the right to participate in state agencies such as the National
Institute for Unemployment (INEM), the Health National Institute (INSA-
LUD), and the National Institute for Social Services (INSERSO), with union
positions being allocated in proportion to the election results.
4 Moreover, the
Socialist government began to support unions financially in proportion to the
number of works council seats they held.
5
It is difficult to determine precisely the number of firms with a works council
since statistically firms are defined as organizational units paying into the so-
cial security system, which may not be coterminous with the constituencies of
works councils. In 1989, when there were about 20,000 units of this type with
more than 50 employees, about 14,000 works council elections were held in
workplaces of this size. The number of workers in these firms was about four
million, while the electorate included about three million. An approximate cal-
culation shows that about 75 percent of the workers in firms with more than
50 employees had the opportunity to vote for a council, and that roughly 70
percent of the workplaces in this category have at least one works council.
4. In every province, unions are entitled to three representatives in every state agency with
provincial offices. A union that obtains a majority of works council seats in all provinces would
thus have 100 representatives in just one agency.
5. Between January 1986 and June 1989, the UGT, the union with the highest income from
subsidies, received 2,127 million pesetas from the government, out of total union revenues of
5,202 million pesetas (UGT 1989, 158).168 Modesto Escobar
All in all, the 109,133 works councils officially counted in the 1990 elections
represented an electorate of 5,443,000 workers. Since there were more than
nine million wage earners in Spain at the time, about 60 percent of Spanish
workers were thus represented by staff delegates or works councils. This figure
could in fact be somewhat higher because some elections do not take place
within the three-month period
6 or are not included in the official results be-
cause of procedural problems.
Another source of evidence on the diffusion of works councils are surveys.
In the 1984 survey directed by Perez-Diaz, only 10 percent of the industrial
workers in enterprises with more than 500 employees, and 50 percent in enter-
prises with fewer than 25 employees, answered that there was no works council
in their firm. The overall results for the six sectors studied (metals, textiles,
building, mining, chemicals, and food processing) showed that 23 percent of
the workers did not have council representation in their workplace. Workers
employed in public firms in those sectors were less likely not to be represented
by a council (8 percent), and the same holds for workers in multinational firms
(12 percent). In private Spanish firms, 27 percent of the workers had no works
council representation.
The legal regulation of works councils in Spain also pertains to the election
process. In workplaces with fewer than 50 workers, voters can vote for between
one and three candidates. In larger workplaces voters must choose between
lists. Each list is composed of a ranked set of candidates belonging to the same
union. The system gives the union section the power to nominate the candi-
dates and makes it very difficult for nonunionized workers to run for election,
although this is possible provided a potential candidate manages to obtain a
minimum number of signatures from workers. Also, any group of workers may
be legally registered as a union and in this case would not have to collect any
signatures. This explains the picturesque names of some unions that won seats
in the 1990 elections.
7
A problem with the closed-list system is that a union may not have enough
members in a workplace to fill a list. The result is that in some nonunionized
firms, union lists include not just union members but also sympathizers, gener-
ally the former at the top and the latter at the bottom. In fact, there is evidence
that a significant number of council members elected on union lists are not
actually union members. In a survey of representatives and members of the
UGT, 24 percent of the works councillors were not members, 5 percent had
quit the union after the election, and of the 71 percent unionized council mem-
6. E.g., a firm studied for this project, with about 10 thousand workers, held elections a year
before the general elections since its first elections had been outside the official counting period
and it followed the four-year rhythm established by the law.
7. E.g., Sociedad Obrera: La Maritima Terrestre (Worker Society: The Terrestrial Navy), Asoci-
acion de Mandos Intermedios de Tubos Reunidos (Association of the Intermediate Command of
the Joined Tubes), and Asociacion de Personal Encuadrado en la Tercera Categorfa de ENDESA
(Association of Staff in Third Category of ENDESA).169 Spain: Works Councils or Unions?
bers 22 percent had joined only after the election (Bouza 1989). Although data
on the other main union in Spain are not available, it is likely that the percent-
age of nonmembers among CCOO works councillors is even higher, as a result
of the greater openness of this union to nonaffiliated workers.
The official election results (table 6.4) show a high and increasing share of
works councillors elected from among union candidates. While in the first free
election 18 percent of elected councillors were nonunion candidates, in 1990
this figure had declined to less than 5 percent, and the two main unions won
almost 80 percent of council seats. These results confirmed the Spanish model
of biunionism, with the exception of two autonomous regions: the Basque
country, where a nationalist Christian Democratic union won more than 37
percent of the seats, and Galicia, where a nationalist leftist union won more
than 23 percent.
While the two main unions interpret the election outcomes as a victory for
the class-oriented labor movement, others, such as the USO, CGT, and CNT,
point to the electoral mechanism, complain about fraud, and blame political
and governmental intervention. As a matter of fact, the electoral rules—for
example, excluding from works council seats candidates from lists with less
than 5 percent of the vote—favor big unions with the ability to present lists in
a large number of workplaces.
Table 6.5 reveals interesting voting patterns. Although on the whole the UGT
was the winner, with 42.6 percent of the vote, in workplaces with more than
49 employees the CCOO was more successful (39.8 percent vs. 37.0 percent).
The main difference between the two unions is found among skilled and un-
skilled workers, where the CCOO is clearly favored. Also, small unions and
nonaffiliated candidates get most of their votes among technical and adminis-
trative staff, while more than one-half of the votes for the UGT come from
workplaces with fewer than 50 workers.
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Table 6.6 Works Council Elections, 1986: Composition by Union of Councils






UGT and CCOO only
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Sources: Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social (MTSS 1987); Instituto de Estudios Superiores
de Administracion (IESA, in preparation).
to which the two main unions are present on them. As no such data are as yet
available for the 1990 elections, we must look at the 1986 results. Of the 11,653
councils for which results were computed, 7,602 had at least one UGT repre-
sentative, and 6,944 had at least one CCOO member. Of the 531 works coun-
cils representing more than 500 employees, only 9.8 percent had neither a UGT
nor a CCOO representative, and 55.0 percent included only UGT or CCOO
representatives. Works councils with only UGT (5.6 percent) or only CCOO
(5.6 percent) members were difficult to find in this segment (table 6.6).
6.5 Works Councils at Work
While there are more than 100,000 works councils in Spain, not all of them
work properly. For example, according to the survey of UGT representatives
and members (Bouza 1989), almost 60 percent of works councils in work-
places with fewer than 30 employees do not use their paid release time. In the
remainder of this paper, seven firms in the metal sector are studied in depth.
8
In four of the firms (A, B, C, and D) the works council had negotiated a legally
recognized collective agreement; the other three (X, Y, and Z) were covered by
the provincial agreement negotiated by the unions and the sectoral employers'
association. Three of the firms had a high level of unionization of more than
50 percent, two a medium level of 15 to 50 percent, and the other two a low
level of less than 15 percent (table 6.7; see the appendix for more details).
In the seven case studies, all works councils in firms with more than 150
employees have important functions to perform, and they perform them effec-
tively. One indicator of their activity is the frequency of their meetings. During



















the period of observation, the number of meetings ranged from one per month
to one per day. The rule for big, highly unionized firms is once a week; in
medium-sized, less unionized firms, once a month. Meetings are more frequent
when industrial agreements are being negotiated, when the employer takes an
unpopular initiative, or when a problem arises.
Unlike the jurados de empresa that preceded them, works councils do not
include management; however, in some meetings management representatives
may be present, either to give legally prescribed information or at the request
of the workers, for example, when they want to raise demands or express disap-
proval. Councils with more than three members usually have a functional divi-
sion of labor. Under the law, a works council with five or more members must
designate a president and a secretary. In general, the president is the leader of
the majority union. The position of secretary tends to go to the leader of the
second-strongest union, unless there is a large majority for the first union, or a
lack of trust between the main unions in the workplace.
In addition to the positions of president and secretary, there are other func-
tions that are distributed among council members. The council may set up
subcommittees on special matters and sometimes is forced to do so by law or
collective agreement. In all firms under study, there was a health and safety
committee, instituted by law in 1971 with a majority of seats held by managers;
its structure is presently under revision. Also, in six of the seven firms there was
a commission referred to as "productivity, production, time study methods," or
simply the "parity commission," the latter referring to the fact that it was com-
posed of the same number of delegates from management and workers. Other
standing committees were concerned with employment and job assignment
and the administration of social funds. Moreover, the works council may create
temporary and task-specific committees, for example, to negotiate a collective
agreement with the employer, to implement a signed agreement, or to lead
a strike. Other committees are formed in response to employer initiatives on
working-time reduction or job regulations. It must be emphasized that mem-
bership in the committees reflects the strength of the different unions at the
workplace. Works council members are assigned to the different committees
by their unions.
The main functions performed by Spanish works councils are the following:173 Spain: Works Councils or Unions?
Negotiation at the firm level: This is one of the main functions assigned to
works councils by legislation. Works councils have a legal right to negotiate
formal agreements. In practice, this is exercised not by the works council as a
whole, but by a committee selected from among its members. This committee
is legal if it represents at least one-half of the council members. This means
that in a firm where one union has an absolute majority of the works council
seats, its union section has the right to negotiate agreements directly with the
management. The normal situation, however, is that the bargaining committee
includes both of the two largest unions, frequently together with a third partner.
Firm-level negotiations are usually held by plant. But there are also
multiplant agreements that involve more than one works council. In this case,
the main role is played by an interplant works council, the creation of which
requires a collective agreement. In two of the three enterprises with more than
one plant, the collective agreement was negotiated by the interplant work coun-
cil. Company D, with more than 20 plants in Spain, had not recognized an
interplant council because management was not willing to assume its costs.
According to the Ministry of Labor, of the 3,137 firm-level agreements, more
than 10 percent are negotiated at the interprovincial level, which implies the
inclusion of members of several works councils. More than one council may
also have been involved in some of the other agreements, to the extent that
firms have more than one plant within a province.
Works councils may also reach semi-informal agreements with the em-
ployer. Agreements of this kind are written and signed by both sides but are
not registered with the public authorities. They are usually improvements on
the sectoral agreement signed by the employers' association and the represen-
tative unions at the sectoral level. Under the Workers' Statute, they determine
the month in which bonuses are paid and the holiday periods. But they also
often regulate wage increases and working hours; in fact, in the three firms
studied that had no formal firm-level collective agreement, there were semi-
informal agreements on these matters.
Works councils may negotiate on everything, including wages. The only ex-
ception to this was under the social pacts signed by the main national unions,
when unionized works councils were charged with implementing at the work-
place the conditions negotiated by their peak organizations. The unlimited
right of works councils to negotiate gives the Spanish collective bargaining
system an anarchic character. In the case of public enterprises, the agreement
reached at the national railway company, RENFE, usually serves as a guideline
for other agreements. Often, however, works councils begin to negotiate wage
increases after a sectoral agreement has been signed, usually trying to exceed
it. It is true that in recent years, firm-level agreements show lower rates of
wage increase than agreements at the industry level. This is explained by other
improvements, for example, in the level of employment or in working condi-
tions, that can be more easily attained at the firm level. Also, sectors without174 Modesto Escobar
firm-level agreements have lower wages, and the effect of union intervention
is to reduce interindustry wage differentials.
Control of managerial decisions: Their legal prerogatives, their facilities,
the protection enjoyed by their members, their legitimacy derived from being
elected by the whole workforce, and the support they receive from the external
unions often enable Spanish works councils to prevent managers from acting
against the rights and interests of the workers.
First and foremost, works councils watch over the legality of management
policies and their implementation. As firms are highly legally regulated in
Spain, a council can threaten to take the employer to court or to go to the labor
administration. This is particularly important in health and safety matters,
where the employer's majorities on the respective committees make it difficult
for conflicts to be resolved inside the firm. Spanish works councils are also
involved in the public regulation of labor markets, which includes control over
temporal contracts, overtime, and mass dismissals. An empirical study in Cata-
lonia showed that 72 percent of the works councils in the sample had appealed
to the courts or to the labor administration in the preceding year. Of the works
councils in firms with more than 500 employees, all had done so (Crespan and
Falguera 1991).
Second, works councils participate in the governance of the internal labor
markets of Spanish firms. They have a voice in promotions and generally do
not favor functional or geographic mobility (Alos-Moner and Lope 1991).
Both issues are of strong interest to workers. Works councils and unions can
use this as a basis for clientelistic practices, which can transform a plant into
a de facto closed shop in situations where there is a dominant union. In addi-
tion, when the number of short-term contracts increased in the late 1980s, de-
mands for transforming these into permanent contracts were increasingly
placed on the agenda of the negotiations between works councils and em-
ployers.
Third, Spanish works councils may have an important role in the introduc-
tion of new technologies and in major changes in work organization. As such
changes may affect the level of employment or the content of jobs, councils
take a close look at employer initiatives in these areas and often impede them.
Cooperation with management: Apart from the management of a firm's so-
cial fund, the most important issue on which Spanish works councils tend to
collaborate with the employer is productivity. As raising productivity makes it
possible to increase wages, councils tend to support almost any measure that
stimulates production. A related topic is absenteeism, which was very high in
Spain during the 1970s, and which works councils helped to fight by agreeing
to the introduction of special bonuses.
Very rarely do works councils collaborate with management on improving
the organization of work. It is commonly accepted among Spanish workers
that this is a managerial matter. However, works councils that are independent
from external unions have sometimes contributed to improving supervision at175 Spain: Works Councils or Unions?
work, especially in firms with low entrepreneurial authority (Iriso 1992). Also,
in company X the president of the works council, who belonged to one of the
two main unions, became the production director of the plant, and the leader
of the rival union was promoted to foreman.
6.5.1 Works Councils and Employers
The introduction of works councils in 1953 was not welcomed by employers
whose power over their workers was very high at the time. Works councils
could be seen, at least in theory, as an instrument with which the official union
could improve the working conditions of its members. A few years later, after
the economic liberalization, employers began to see works councils as poten-
tially improving the efficiency of their enterprises, and as a means of coupling
wage increases to productivity growth. At the same time, works councils paved
the way for free, and at first illegal, unions. The most important of these was
the Communist CCOO, making employers and the state again seek to put
unionism under some form of control.
During the democratic transition, employers, unionists, workers, and politi-
cians shared the conviction that works councils were an institution that should
be included in a democratic organization of industrial relations. Employers
feared, however, that the CCOO would establish a monopoly over worker rep-
resentation. Organized employers therefore promoted a pluralist union system
and supported workers organizations other than the CCOO. There are reasons
to believe that in the first works council elections, employers backed the UGT
especially, which attracted the vote of the moderate workers with its bargaining
rather than mobilizing strategy.
The agreement between the UGT and the CEOE in 1979, which paved the
way for the Workers' Statute, recognized the important role of works councils
at the workplace. At the same time it allowed for the organization of internal
unions, which was the main weapon of the UGT against the CCOO, and thus
gave a bargaining role to the unions even at the firm level. The CEOE accepted
this by signing a national agreement on workplace union organization, which
favored the UGT, in exchange for social peace at the workplace in a moment
of economic crisis and political transition. Five years later, with a Socialist
government backing the UGT while holding an absolute majority in Parlia-
ment, the Organic Law of Union Freedom confirmed the union sections by law.
In a survey of 608 employers in seven industrial sectors accounting for 70
percent of Spanish industrial workers, 29 percent called industrial relations in
their firm "excellent", and 60 percent "tolerable" (Perez-Diaz 1985). Seventy-
eight percent expressed trust in their workers, and 43 percent in their works
councils; only 8 percent distrusted the latter. Internal union sections were
viewed with less favor. Only 50 percent of the employers had a good opinion
of them, whereas 25 percent had a bad one; 53 percent recognized their knowl-
edge of the firm, but 51 percent criticized their ideological stance. Even more
respondents lacked confidence in the external unions, which were seen as polit-176 Modesto Escobar
icized (65 percent) rather than as promoting the interests of the workers
(27 percent).
When managements take unpopular measures, works councils become cru-
cial because they can mobilize the workforce easily. Employers have learned
that it is better to announce such measures in advance to the works council.
This may delay implementation because, inevitably, negotiations ensue; how-
ever, if managers take decisions without previous information, the council can
mobilize resistance and thus make implementation even less likely.
Still, in general the strategy of Spanish employers seems to be to reduce the
role of the works council to the minimum. Employers prefer to manage the
workforce through a hierarchical line of command, unless they are forced to
do otherwise by legal regulations. Union strength in a firm also influences the
role the works council is allowed to play. Another factor that affects the behav-
ior of the employer toward the council is the extent to which the different union
forces are in agreement. When unions are united the works council may take a
leading role, while when they disagree the union sections become more im-
portant. In company B, where there was fundamental agreement between the
two main unions, the works council was stronger than the union sections. In
companies A and X, employers had to deal with the union sections because of
high interunion conflict, while in companies D and Z, with weak unions, works
councils again played the leading role.
Strategies of employers in relation to works councils thus vary from firm to
firm. The following, nonexclusive classification can be suggested:
1. The role of works councils can be minimized, in particular by refusing
them the right to negotiate by abiding by the sectoral industrial agreement.
This can easily be done in small or medium-sized firms without a tradition of
collective bargaining, for example, in companies X, Y, and Z.
2. A collaborationist union can be promoted in order to keep other unions
out. This is possible only where there is no previous union presence, and there
were no examples of this in our sample.
3. Employers can offer to cooperate with unionized council members,
granting them involvement in the organization of production and participation
in exchange for improvements in efficiency. This is possible in medium-sized
firms where external unions have no control over their affiliates, or in some
enterprises with foreign capital (companies X and Z).
4. Employers can try to divide the council by signing agreements with the
least conflict-oriented group of representatives and thus reducing the popular-
ity and support of the others. This strategy requires a strong division between
unions, as was usually the case in the period of national industrial agreements
not signed by the CCOO. Company A belongs in this category, although the
Socialist union in this case is more radical than its Communist opponent.
5. Employers can take an aggressive position in negotiations on one specific
subject, at the risk of a strike and in the hope that this will prevent other issues177 Spain: Works Councils or Unions?
from being negotiated, which would reinforce the position of the employer.
This pattern was found in companies C and D.
6. Employers can accept the demands of unionized works councils on
wages and hours to avoid a strike. This attitude prevailed in companies C and
D during the late 1980s. A strategy like this is possible only in prosperous
sectors or in periods of expansion.
In public firms, works councils play a more active role, usually advised by
external union officials in negotiating collective agreements at the firm level.
Public sector managements have recently adopted a more confrontational
stance toward works councils, under pressure to contribute to government ob-
jectives such as the reduction of inflation and public expenditure and the re-
structuring of publicly owned enterprises. In public administration, however,
negotiations take place only with unions; works councils, called juntas de per-
sonal instead of comites de empresa, play only a minor role.
6.5.2 Works Councils and Unions
As pointed out above, the election system based on closed lists makes run-
ning candidates easier for a big union than for independent and small unions.
Today almost 80 percent of Spanish works councillors belong to one of the
two main unions. The remaining 20 percent is due to three factors. First, in
some regions there are strong nationalist unions, especially in the Basque
country and in Galicia. Surprisingly, there is no similar union in Catalonia,
probably because of the independence and nationalism of the Catalan section
of the CCOO, called Comisiones Obreras Nacionalistas de Cataluna, and the
high proportion of immigrant workers from other Spanish regions. Second, in
the public sector a coalition of independent unions usually wins more than a
quarter of the works council seats. And third, in some firms there are groups
of independent workers, leftist or rightist, with a charismatic leader trained in
one of the main unions before resigning from it.
9
Apart from works councils, the other legal mechanism of workplace repre-
sentation in Spanish firms is the union section, defined as the group of workers
affiliated to a given union. The union section functions as the extended arm of
the union at the workplace. It has a number of legal rights, such as to distribute
information to the workers, bargain collective agreements if bargaining is not
conducted through the works council, and be given physical facilities for per-
forming its activities. Also, in workplaces with more than 250 workers, each
union section is entitled to be represented by one union delegate on the works
council, with voice but without the right to vote. In workplaces with more than
5,000 workers, the number of union delegates increases to up to four.
9. An example is Pablo Rodriguez, the main leader of the Union Platform in the Municipal
Transport Authority of Madrid. After gaining a high wage agreement, he won an absolute majority
in the works council while the CCOO and UGT lost all their previous council members.178 Modesto Escobar
Given that works councils appeared in Spain earlier than the present unions,
one might say that the latter have absorbed them. Yet, contrary to the German
case, in Spain two unions compete for representative space at the workplace,
which turns the council into an arena of interunion competition where unions
discuss and, perhaps, agree on their strategies inside a workplace.
The opinion of the main Spanish unions on the two forms of representation
are rather different. The CCOO defends the councils as a representative body
that defends the rights of the workers. Works councils are viewed as expressing
the interests of the rank and file under the guidance of the labor movement.
The UGT on its part stresses the danger that a works council may lose sight of
workers' general interests and may defend only the interests of the employees
of a given firm. For this reason, the main actor in the negotiation of collective
agreements should be the union section, inspired and led by the external union
which provides the correct analysis of the situation and pursues the right policy
for the working class as a whole.
The two positions were very different at the beginning of the democratic
transition, when the CCOO wanted a unitary union built up from below, in
which the CCOO-dominated works councils would have played an important
role in articulating a confrontational policy at the firm level. The UGT, by
contrast, sought recognition with a moderate strategy of negotiation (Zufiaur
1985). Since the general strike of 1988, the two unions have followed a unitary
strategy, seeking common platforms at levels above the individual firm and,
less frequently, at the firm level and trying to develop more similar conceptions
of what a union is or must be. "Far from pushing the works council and the
union section against each other, we have to think about how we can enable
union policy to penetrate inside the firm" (CCOO 1992).
As a consequence of the long debate between the unions, the views of the
workers on the two institutions are divided. In a survey conducted in mid-1988,
25.7 percent of workers answered that the best voice for them at the workplace
was the works council, 18.3 percent mentioned the union sections, 14.5 percent
(but only 3.8 percent in firms with more than 500 workers) mentioned manage-
ment, and 10.8 percent mentioned mass meetings (IDES 1989). Union mem-
bers favor works councils at a higher rate than nonmembers (33.3 percent).
What is even more important is that, in spite of the different positions of their
unions, there is no major difference in the views of CCOO and UGT members.
Workers in firms with more than 49 employees are more in favor of works
councils as a mechanism of voice (33.2 percent) than workers in small firms.
But, again, CCOO and UGT members or sympathizers are more in favor of
works councils than workers belonging to or inclined toward other unions.
The main problems external unions face today are their low presence in
some sectors of the economy, in small and medium-sized enterprises, and in
the black economy; the autonomy of internal unions due to the strong position
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resources on the part of the main union federations, which increases the inter-
nal unions' autonomy.
There is no legal regulation of the relationships between union sections and
works councils. However, there is a pattern of low participation of workers in
union activities (Tezanos 1982; Equipo de Investigation Sociologica [EDIS]
1983; IDES 1989; Bouza 1989; Alos-Moner and Lope 1991; Perez-Diaz 1992;
Iriso 1992). Where there is a small union section, its principal members are at
the same time the works council leaders (Lope 1991). Almost without excep-
tion, the leader of the internal union has the most powerful position in the
representative system of the firm. While in small firms there may not be enough
union members to fill all council positions, in unionized firms there is no divi-
sion of functions: those who are on the executive committee of the internal
union also represent the whole workforce on the works council (Alos-Moner
and Lope 1991).
As the organization of Spanish unions is based on both geographical and
sectoral lines, internal unions and works councils may have relations with dif-
ferent kinds of external unions. Works councils located in the main city of a
province are likely to have links to industrial unions, while councils in small
localities are typically connected to local unions unless their industrial sector
is very important in the area. Usually, however, it is the industrial union that
supplies the internal union with information and from which works councillors
expect help in performing their tasks, such as legal services, training, or pro-
grammatic guidance.
Nevertheless, the relationship between members and works councillors on
the one hand and the external union on the other is rather loose. In the survey
of UGT affiliates, 40 percent of their works council representatives had not
been to the external union office in more than a month, and the rate of partici-
pation of council members in elections to external union bodies was only 50
percent. Recently, external unions have tried to improve contacts with their
representatives by offering them training courses, which according to the sur-
vey have been attended by 46 percent of UGT council members. However,
works council membership means active participation in union activities and
in this sense performs an important training function for the external unions.
The majority of present union leaders come from the works councils of im-
portant firms, meaning that councils lose their main leaders to the external
unions (Fishman 1990). Other losses occur because the external unions' small
organizational resources force them to sometimes use elected works council
members with paid release time for work at the external union office.
The level at which collective bargaining is conducted for a particular enter-
prise is a key factor in the relationship of its works council to the external
union. In a firm under a provincial or national agreement, the works council
watches over the implementation of the agreement and needs the external
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pendent or local unions are usually not well regarded by workers is that they
are less able to do this. On the other hand, where the contract is negotiated at
the firm level, works councils are of greater importance and have more auton-
omy. In this case, the relationship with the external union depends on the ex-
tent to which the company agreement corresponds to the union's recommenda-
tions. If there is correspondence, members of the works council are likely to
be invited to take part in sectoral or regional negotiations above the enterprise
level. Otherwise, there is either growing autonomy of the internal union or a
split, with a subsequent loss of union membership.
Firms with works councils have higher union membership than firms with-
out them. But this is a spurious association. Workplaces with councils are
larger. In fact, it is likely that the Spanish works council system reduces union
membership because the collective agreements negotiated by the council are
extended to everyone in the firm. Union members enjoy no instrumental advan-
tage. The election procedure explains why there is a minimum number of
members in unions that want to be representative. Once this level is attained,
unions usually have little interest in increasing their membership.
6.5.3 Works Councils and Workers
As we have seen, while union membership among works councillors is high,
rates of union affiliation in Spain are very low in general. This raises the ques-
tion of the legitimacy of Spanish works councils. A good indicator for the
acceptance of works councils among Spanish workers is election turnout. In
1986, 79.8 percent of those eligible to vote voted in the works council elec-
tions; in 1990, this share had declined slightly to 74.0 percent. Another indica-
tor is the way workers evaluate works councils. In Perez-Diaz's survey of six
industrial sectors in 1984, one-quarter of the workers interviewed did not have
a works council, one-tenth did not answer the question; 45 percent evaluated
their council as satisfactory, and less than 20 percent found it unsatisfactory.
Excluding workers without a works council, 60 percent of the respondents
were satisfied with their councils, while 36 percent were not. The survey also
offers evidence on what workers expect from works councils. With respect to
who should negotiate with the employer, less than 10 percent answered that it
should be the unions, while more than 60 percent assigned this function to an
elected committee. That is, workers tend to accept the negotiating role of the
works councils.
Regarding workforce participation through works councils, respondents
were asked who decided and who should decide a range of issues in their firm,
such as working time, work organization, employment practices, investment,
and sales. Possible answers were management only, management after con-
sulting with workers, and management and workers together by agreement.
The results show that the only aspect that is negotiated is the time schedule,
though even here 40 percent of the workers think that this is decided by the
employer alone. At the same time, workers feel that, with the exception of181 Spain: Works Councils or Unions?
investments and sales, all decisions on matters in the survey should be subject
to agreement between the "two sides."
Another important aspect of the relationship between works councils and
workers is communication between them. In principle, one may distinguish
three possible patterns: (1) an informative relationship, with information flow-
ing from the works councils to their constituents, (2) a representative relation-
ship, where information flows from the workforce to the employer through
the work council, and (3) mediation by the works council between employers
and employees.
Works councils give information to workers mainly through mass meetings.
The Workers' Statute establishes a maximum of six mass meetings per firm
every year, at which council members can give information. When the works
council is negotiating with the employer, it can call more than one mass meet-
ing in a two-month period. Attendance varies over time and between firms. It
is difficult to call a mass meeting in a nonunionized workplace, except in peri-
ods of negotiations over wages or employment. In companies D, Y, and Z,
attendance at mass meetings was low, apart from special circumstances when
more than 70 percent attended. In companies A and B, works councils regu-
larly used the lunch breaks to inform the workforce. Mass meetings enjoy a
high degree of legitimacy, in spite of certain perceived shortcomings. In the
1984 survey, more than 90 percent of workers agreed with the statement "Mass
meetings are essential for the workers to discuss and solve their problems," and
85 percent with the sentence "In mass meetings one gets information and can
discuss, but only a few know the problems and dare to speak up." Unionized
workers are better informed than nonunionized ones because of better informal
relations with plant union leaders and because of special mass meetings for
union members only.
Representation, of course, is at the core of the functions of Spanish works
councils and plays a central role in negotiations with the employer. A unionized
works council represents at least two sets of interests: those of the union and
those of the workers that have elected it to improve or defend their working
conditions. There may also be conflicting interests among the workforce itself.
Two main cleavages can be distinguished in Spanish firms in the 1990s: techni-
cians versus manual workers and temporary employees versus employees with
an indefinite contract.
The main mechanism that works councils and union officials use for defin-
ing the interests they represent is the negotiating platform. This is a catalog
of demands, written independently by each union or group of workers with
representation on the works council and to varying degrees taking into account
the recommendations of the external unions and the demands and problems of
the employees in the firm. Internal unions are essentially autonomous in defin-
ing their policies; in 1991 the two main union confederations stopped giving
specific recommendations for wage increases to sectoral federations and work-
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platforms: they may simply take over the recommendations of their external
union, may modify them in line with the views of the local leadership, may
sound out the views of rank-and-file activists at the workplace, or may even
incorporate the demands of nonunionized workers individually expressed
through an informal survey or at a mass meeting.
An alternative, reflecting the recent tendency of the two main union confed-
erations to act in unison, is to write a common negotiating platform. Where
this is done, and no union proposes an alternative, the works council takes the
lead. Otherwise, platforms developed by the different unions may be unified
later, with the unions' works council representatives negotiating a compromise
or all workers in a mass meeting voting for a common position to be presented
to the employer (Lope 1991). Workplace leaders prefer unified platforms in
the belief that they make it easier to extract concessions from the employer.
The most critical moment in the negotiation process arises when the negoti-
ating committee begins to talk to management. Negotiations are accompanied
by a continuous flow of information from the committee to the works council,
and from there to the workforce. Keeping the workforce informed serves sev-
eral functions: it mobilizes the support of the workers—who may be asked to
go on strike—and makes known the distinctive policies and strategies of the
different unions and other groups, in an effort to obtain votes in the future.
Divisions between unions complicate the negotiations. A union may, for ex-
ample, quit the negotiating committee, making it impossible for the committee
to meet the legal requirement of representation of at least 50 percent of the
works council members. Unions may also remain on the negotiating committee
but refuse to sign the agreement; this will leave unfulfilled the requirement
that 60 percent of the committee members must give their consent. To prevent
interunion conflict of this kind, referendums are increasingly used on issues on
which the two leading unions disagree.
A third, less important function of works councils is their mediating role
between employers and workers. Conflicts between the two are sometimes re-
solved by calling in a works council member, without appealing to a court.
Council members both have a closer relationship with management than other
workers and are respected as leaders by the workers. They may therefore be in
a good position to help resolve everyday conflicts between the employer and
individual employees. Sometimes the employer uses the works council to relate
information to a worker or a group of workers, and more often workers use the
works councils for communicating problems to management. This is more
likely to happen if workers are affiliated to a union because their union leader
is very likely also a works council member or union delegate. However, non-
unionized workers may also find it easier to solve their problems by talking to
their representatives than to their superiors. This may be another source of the
clientelism of unions at the workplace, serving to recruit members and, more
important, to obtain votes.183 Spain: Works Councils or Unions?
6.6 Conclusions and Future Prospects
Spanish industrial relations are becoming decentralized. After the mixed
success of the social pacts, employers' associations and unions are favorably
disposed toward enterprise-level negotiations, letting rank-and-file union
members take the leading role.
Works councils in Spain are not an alternative to unions, nor do they stand
in opposition to unions. Their main function in the Spanish industrial relations
system is to be an arena in which divergent union policies can be confronted
and may be joined. This is because there are not clear boundaries between
union and works council functions. While the former do try to take over the
latter, the existence of another union that competes to represent the workers is
an unsurmountable obstacle. Only if the present unity between the two main
Spanish unions lasts can the importance of works councils be expected to
increase.
In Spain, it has been unusual for works councils to contribute to the restruc-
turing of companies and to help in increasing internal flexibility. The reason is
that Spanish councils are highly unionized, and unions face other problems,
such as bargaining over wages and hours, regulating working conditions, and
surviving in competition with rival unions, as well as dealing with unemploy-
ment and developing social services and the welfare state. At the same time,
because of works councils' special conditions and their relative autonomy
from the external unions, employers and workers may be developing a relation-
ship of trust mediated by councils. In such instances, councils may contribute
to improving efficiency through productivity agreements with employers based
on a positive-sum game within individual firms.
Appendix
Firms Studied for This Paper
Company A is a 40-year-old firm with three main plants located in three differ-
ent provinces. It belongs to the automobile sector and has frequently changed
ownership. Although it was heavily affected by the economic crisis, it survived
because of state funds. Nevertheless, in the last 10 years it has reduced its
workforce by half.
The plant studied has around 3,000 workers. Its works council includes 25
elected members and seven union delegates (four representing the UGT and
three the CCOO). Union density, at 70 percent, is very high by Spanish stan-
dards. While the UGT has more members because of its strong position among
clerical workers, the CCOO remains the main union among direct production184 Modesto Escobar
workers and in the last works council elections received the highest number of
votes. There are also four council members from an enterprise union backed
mainly by technicians and clerical workers.
The firm has a collective agreement that covers all three plants. It is negoti-
ated by the interplant council, complemented by plant-level bargaining con-
ducted by local works councils. The latter are also in charge of the implementa-
tion of the agreement. Relations between works councils and employer were
good when the firm was still a public enterprise. Since privatization, however,
there has been less communication, and the works council complains about
insufficient information on the restructuring process.
The CCOO and UGT have gone through different stages in their relation-
ship. At the time of the study there were in an intense battle with each other.
Interunion conflict had made it necessary to submit the collective agreement
for the preceding year to a referendum of the workforce, with the UGT taking
the more radical position—mainly on the restructuring of the firm and on mo-
bility and redundancies—and losing.
Company B is a multinational automobile firm. Unlike company A, it has
not undergone a loss of employment or change of ownership. Although it has
several plants in Spain, its main factory is outside Madrid, with 10,000 em-
ployees working in different nearby plants that have only one works council.
The council consists of 40 members. The CCOO has one representative more
than the UGT, and there is a third union, the anarchist CGT, with five represen-
tatives. The works council also includes 20 union delegates, half of them be-
longing to the UGT and the others to the CCOO and CGT. This reflects the
UGT's higher membership; the CCOO, however, obtained more votes in the
elections.
The firm does not have an interplant works council. There is only one collec-
tive agreement for a two-year period. The negotiators for the workers are drawn
from the works council; they are assisted by experts from their unions. Council
members were highly satisfied with the last agreement; they had won a high
wage increase and had been able to convert a large number of temporary em-
ployment contracts into permanent ones. Apart from wages, the most important
concern of the unions is employment. Much attention is paid to monitoring the
firm's subcontracting activities in order to avoid labor market segmentation.
Relations between council and management were smooth at the time of the
study, although there had been conflicts in the past when the unions had been
more radical. A works council delegation, composed of the president, the sec-
retary, and one delegate of every union, meets frequently with the personnel
director. Interunion relationships are more complicated. Since the late 1980s,
the UGT and the CCOO have been working together because of the existence
of a common adversary, the anarchist sympathizers who prefer an alternative
model of industrial relations based on decisions of the rank-and-file. Before
that time, however, the two main unions did not always have the same views,
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CCOO, there had been a history of factions and resignations that ended with a
victory for the moderates.
Company C has more than 3,000 employees. The firm belongs to the tele-
communications sector and was owned by the state until it was sold to a multi-
national company. There are two works councils, one for six plants in the prov-
ince of Madrid and another for a special category of workers based all over the
country. The first council has a CCOO majority, while the second is dominated
by the UGT. A third, right-wing union also has representatives on both coun-
cils. There is also a joint works council with 13 members, drawn from the two
directly elected councils, that negotiates those parts of the collective agreement
that are common for the two halves of the firm. Union density is around 20
percent.
In the five years before the study the firm's good economic situation led to
an increase in its labor force through temporary contracts. However, future
prospects are less good, and in spite of union opposition temporary workers
are not being reemployed. The works councils supervise the implementation
of the collective agreement, especially with respect to working conditions and
employment. Relations with management used to be paternalistic but are now
changing. A number of unpopular measures were taken that were contested by
the works councils with the backing of the workforce. Interunion relations have
also been changing. Lately, interactions between the UGT and the CCOO have
been cooperative, reflecting the new unity of action at the peak level; inside
each union, however, there are different views about this.
Company D is a multinational computer company with 20 plants in Spain.
The firm once had more than 2,000 employees but has reduced its workforce
by 20 percent in three years, almost exclusively by not reemploying temporary
workers. Economic problems remain, and greater employment reductions are
envisaged.
In each of the 20 workplaces there is a works council, except in plants with
fewer than 50 workers; these have between one and three staff delegates. No
interplant works council exists; there is, however, a coordinating committee
that negotiates a collective agreement for all workers whose plant is not cov-
ered by an agreement of its own.
Union density and union strength in the firm are low, apart from the produc-
tion plant. While there is a UGT majority in the latter, all other works councils
are dominated by the CCOO. There are also a few independent works council-
lors. Recently, negotiations on employment reduction have been taking place,
assisted by officials from the external unions. Relations with management are
very poor, and lack of trust is common on both sides. There is also disagree-
ment between the unions on redundancies and negotiation procedures.
Company X is a medium-sized firm with a long history of strong unionism
and a number of takeovers, after having been originally a family-owned busi-
ness. When research was in progress, there was an intense period of negotia-
tions aimed at saving the firm from bankruptcy. The works council has fewer186 Modesto Escobar
than 10 members, all of whom are from the two main unions, with a slight
majority for the CCOO. There is no formal collective agreement; the firm fol-
lows the provincial agreement for the metal sector, with specific improvements
negotiated formally with the works council but de facto with the two union
sections separately.
Parts of management and the works council maintain good relations in an
attempt to solve the crisis of the enterprise. Workers and unions, mainly the
CCOO, are willing to make concessions in order to save the firm. However,
there is a tradition of interunion rivalry that makes collaboration with manage-
ment difficult. In the present crisis, as in many other firms, external union offi-
cials join the negotiations to assist the works council.
Company Y is a medium-sized firm that produces metal furniture. It has
more than 500 employees, a majority of whom are low-skilled direct produc-
tion workers. The firm's economic situation was good at the time of inter-
viewing. Union density, at 25 percent, is high by Spanish standards. Half of
the union members belong to the CCOO, the other half to the UGT. In the last
council elections there were three lists of candidates, the third submitted by a
group of independent workers who won five seats. A short time later, however,
all but one of them had joined the CCOO.
The strategies of the UGT and CCOO are very similar. As with many other
works councils, the unions try with some success to defend existing working
conditions, but it is very difficult for them to obtain improvements. Up to the
time of research, the council had failed to get a formal collective agreement
for the firm and had been unsuccessful in getting indefinite contracts for a large
number of temporary workers. Its main weapon was its control of overtime.
Union sections did not work properly, and their functions were completely in
the hands of the works council.
Company Z is a medium-sized firm with about 200 workers producing tele-
communications equipment. It is owned by foreign capital and uses flexible
methods of production, with high functional mobility. Union density is less
than 10 percent. The works council consists exclusively of women, although
women make up only 30 percent of the labor force. Only one list was presented
at the last election, under the name of the UGT; however, it included one
CCOO member and a few independent workers. The council's main activities
are to police irregularities, especially with respect to health and safety condi-
tions and redundancies. The council sometimes uses help from the external
union to solve problems with management.
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